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Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte,  





 Of the many domains of investigation located within a philosophical concern 
with the aesthetic, the one to be engaged here begins with the subject/object 
relation.1 Part of the contention to be developed is that once that relation is given 
centrality then the strictly aesthetic – understood as the interplay of the affective 
and the cognitive - - encounters its own limit.  However, that relation cannot be 
posited. Nor can there be the assumption that it is static. The relation has an 
intrinsic dynamism insofar as it identifies the continuity of encounter between 
subject and object. Both subject and object continue therefore to come into 
relation. Two questions open this engagement. The first pertains to the 
particularity of art: Is there a distinction between an object that falls under the 
rubric of what Kant identifies as ‘fine art’ (schone Kunst) and thus what will 
become the work of art, and any other possible object? In other words, does the 
work of art have its own specificity?  The second question pertains to the subject. 
Again, what is at stake are forms of particularity: Does the nature of the subject 
and thus subjectivity remain constant within all instances of the subject/object 
relation? Implicit in this second question is the possibility that what would count as 
experience within the realm of the aesthetic in the movement towards the 
attribution of centrality to the object cannot be straightforwardly generalized. 
Encounters would differ accordingly. On one level, it is clear that as Kant develops 
the three Critiques there is repetition, refinement and reinforcement of the 
general structure of subjectivity. However, if there is a quality that distinguishes 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment from the other two, thereby allowing the 
first and second Critiques a different after life, it can be located in the nature of 
the object within the encounter with ‘fine art’. To which it should be added that 
the encounter is different if the object of experience is a mere copy of an already 
existence art work - and here art work extends from poem to painting – than if it 
were an object defined by its ‘originality’. The move from copy to original involves 
a division in how the object is understood and equally entails a division within the 
structure of the encounter itself. The effect on the subject of works of genius is 
importantly different.2 Their clarification should form an essential element of a 
systematic engagement with what Kant designates as the  ‘aesthetic’ within his 
overall critical project. 
 
The copy is an object whose presence and reception can be understood as 
involving a form of immediacy. No longer the immediacy of beauty – i.e. as that 
which pleases immediately – rather it is the immediacy of the mechanical re-
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presentation of what is. However, the object defined by ‘originality’ is not simply 
different qua object, it is also the case that encountering it necessitates ‘the 
power of judgment’ (Urteilskraft).3 It calls on judgment. As a result, part of the 
argument here is that this conception of judgement becomes a form of mediation. 
Judgment exceeds pleasure. Moreover, once Kant’s position is developed, it can be 
seen that the nature of ‘originality’ demands an account of the object that has to 
start with a radical divide. While there is a significant distinction between the 
copy (in the realm of the aesthetic) and a more general sense of object delimited 
by its ‘purpose’, of far greater import, as noted above, is the divide between the 
copy and the original. If there were a way into a thinking of originality in the 
realm of the aesthetic that accords with Kant’s larger concerns, then it is not 
difficult to find an affinity with both the opening description of the Enlightenment 
located in his famous 1784 essay ‘An answer to the question: What is 
Enlightenment?’, and the imperative to which it gives rise.  
 
Kant defines the Enlightenment in terms of a form of movement: 
‘Enlightenment is the emergence of man from his self-incurred immaturity. 
(Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit)’.4 (Emphasis added) The movement is the process of becoming 
original; and thus the reformulation of the Enlightenment as the finding of that 
voice in which what is spoken is not mere repetition. The division between the 
original and mechanical repetition, which can be expressed as the impossibility, in 
the language of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, of reducing all objects to 
‘mechanical imitation’ (mechanischen Nachahmung) is already announced in the 
force of the demand Sapere aude! Originality is an opening. In both instances, it is 
an ‘emergence’ (Ausgang). Part of the argument to be developed is that this 
emergence contains the possibility of its also being the movement of surpassing or 
unbinding that is a coming into relation. (Hence the dynamic quality of the 
subject/object relation.) An outcome that is already there in §49 of the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment in the description of the poet as the one who ‘moves 
the sensible beyond the limit (über die Schranken) of experience’; and then 
secondly, in the claim that ‘a representation of the imagination (eine Vorstellung 
der Einbildungskraft)’ can on the level of the aesthetic ‘expand the concept itself 
in an unbounded way (auf unbegrentze Art).5  Limits and bounds are there (thus 
always already given) to be overcome. Indeed, it is this overcoming that obviates 
the hold of a boundary as both pregiven and determinate. It is the emergence – the 
happening – of bounded openness that enjoins judgement. As such the presence of 
limits, in the context of the aesthetic, are always after effects. Judgment secures 
the boundary as the result of the object’s having come into relation. 
 
Precisely because ‘fine art’ emerges without the presence of a rule that is 
followed, indeed Kant ends §48 with the claim that the best that can be said is 
that ‘the rule hovered before the eyes of the artist (die Regel dem Künstler von 
Augen geschwebt)’, and thus the rule has a necessarily indeterminate relation to 
the object, there has to be an account of the result of that productive 
indeterminate relation, an indetermination named as ‘hovering’. Originality, as 
will become clear, names the object as an original indetermination.6 At the outset, 
however, the insistence on the possibility of what comes to be identified as 
‘original’, and thus in having to concede to the insistent presence of the original – 
it insists because the original calls on thought -  leads Kant to the recognition that 
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what has to be provided is an account of the object’s production. The produced 
holds itself apart from that which is taken to be merely given. There is a division 
therefore within the economy of the gift. Hence, the presence of the original as 
itself an instance of the forming and informing of form, is part of another 
important though fundamentally different economy of giving. Within its 
effectuation the object is produced. As produced it then becomes the object 
within the subject/object relation. As a result, an account of production is not just 
essential, it exerts a determining force both on the act and explanation of the 
encounter. The contention here is that Kant’s account of ‘genius’ in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment is central to an understanding of what is at work within 
both a rethinking of the object as produced, and then also with the consequences 
of that rethinking for any subsequent account of the encountering of the object. A 
step has been taken therefore in addressing the first of the opening questions 
noted at the outset. Once emphasis is given to production as providing the locus of 
encounter, objects can then have qualities that resist that form of assimilation 
that would have demanded an abstract generalizable sense of the object. The 
project here is to show how Kant’s account of genius in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment (and related texts) allows for the development of a conception of the 
aesthetic object, the mimetic and, in the end, the work of art, that resists the 
effacing of particularity through too hasty a generalization of the subject/object 
relation (the latter both in terms of its content as well as the movement of 
relationality itself). Moreover, accepting that genius is linked to production and 
thus not to a conception of genius as a personified agent moves the philosophical 
way from the centrality of both the given and the subject and thus towards the 
produced.7 Such a possibility locates Kant’s engagement with genius at the 
threshold between aesthetics and a philosophy of art. The latter only emerges 
when centrality is attributed to the objectivity of the object: the object as the 
locus of presentation. This necessitates a move beyond the cognitive. The 
centrality of the object demands it. This occurs once the object – understood in 
terms of the relation between ideational content and material presence – has 
become the locus of the philosophical. Kant on genius is therefore at that 





Genius in Kant is a theory of production. It is defined not just in relation to 
mimesis broadly understood, but in terms of the distinction drawn by Kant 
between Nachmachung and Nachahmung. The latter - Nachahmung - delimits the 
produced object within the encounter of subject and object. Within that 
encounter production and informed response are importantly different; the 
informed response takes on the quality of judgment. Production involves genius, 
while judgment necessitates taste (where taste is understood in terms of its strict 
Kantian delimitation). The opening of §48 of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment is clear in this regard; 
 
For the judging of beautiful objects (schone Gegenstände), as such (als 
solcher), taste is required; but for beautiful art itself, i.e. for producing 
such objects (der Hervorbringung solche Gegenstände) genius is required.9 
 
 4 
And here it should be noted that Kant identifies his locus of concern as the object 
‘as such’. The use of the formulation ‘as such’ however does not identify the 
object as merely given but as produced; it is brought forth. (Hence the continual 
need to recognize that what is at stake more generally is the quality of the 
appearance. Understanding the nature of appearance has to begin with the 
position that what appears is not what is given, were the given delimited by 
immediacy. On the contrary, what appears is what has been produced, and for 
that precise reason calls on judgment.10) As genius is a mode of production and not 
a subject description – indeed it is possible to argue that as a mode of production 
it produces both the work, what has to be understood as the ‘object’, as well as 
the producer, i.e. the genius (were the latter to be personified) - the overriding 
question pertains to the quality of the production. Indeed, it is possible to note 
the force of Kant’s claim in what can be interpreted as Novalis’ attempted counter 
to it. Novalis in the Logological Fragments writes that: 
 
He who cannot make poems will only be able to judge them negatively. 
True criticism requires the ability to create the product to be criticized 
oneself. Taste alone judges negatively.11 
 
Now while it is possible to read Kant, especially in aspects of the argumentation of 
§50, as concurring with elements of this formulation, what is significant however is 
the way it departs from what has become possible with the emergence of what 
might be described as the concept of genius. While Novalis is primarily concerned, 
in the context of this fragment, with the response to the object (to that which 
appears) it should be clear that he stresses the figure of the genius; the genius as 
the agent of production. Here, however, genius remains the figure. Genius now has 
a necessary personification; the one who elsewhere is the ‘idol’ where the ‘idol is 
the analogy of the human being’.12 As though as a figure it crossed the divide 
between subject and object and thus produced and judger. The genius, within 
Novalis’ configuration, becomes as a result the one whose actions could then be 
accounted for either in terms of intentionality or the will. If this were to hold then 
what is diminished is the possibility of conceiving of genius as a mode of 
production. The anthropomorphism of genius, while always possible and indeed in 
certain instances Kant succumbs to it, occludes that which is intrinsic to the 
concept of genius.13 Starting with Kant what continues to matter therefore is the 
nature of the object rather than the subject.  (As has already been noted the 
producer – the poet, artist, etc. – as a subject position, is itself produced.) In the 
Critique of Pure Reason objects are given to subjects.14 That gift brings the 
defining elements of cognition into play.15 In regard to genius however rather than 
the giveness of the object what endues as central is a specific instance of the 
production of the object. In more general terms, the presence of production as a 
question cannot be separated from the philosophical problem of appearance; i.e. 
of the ontology and temporality of what appears and thus of both presentation 
itself and the enjoined response of judgment.  
 
The opening of §47 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is central to 
any understanding of appearance: ‘Everyone agrees that genius is entirely opposed 
to the spirit of imitation (Nachahmungsgesite)’. What however is the ‘spirit of 
imitation’? Before taking up the issues to which this particular formulation gives 
rise – issues which in the end, as will be suggested, continue to center on the 
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question of life – it is essential to note some of the terminological questions at 
work in the distinction between Nachmachung and Nachahmung.  Clarification is 
necessary as it is clear that there are difficulties maintaining complete 
terminological consistency. The problem of consistency however should not stand 
in the way of the identification of the issues that are involved. In a sense, it might 
be suggested that part of Kant’s project is the attempt to recover the vocabulary 
best adapted to it. While, as noted above, Kant does claim that genius is ‘opposed 
to the spirit of imitation’ (Nachahmungsgesite), it is also true that the term Geist, 
linked to a concern with genius, appears in different guises elsewhere. In the 
Pillau Lectures, for example, Kant writes of ‘spirit’ that it ‘is the enlivening of the 
sensibility (die Belebung der Sinnlichkeit) through the Idea’.16 Within the overall 
attempt to position genius as a mode of production, Geist needs to be taken more 
generally as that which enlivens. It is the interplay of Geist and Leben that 
continues to have greatest significance. Geist is not simply an important topic, it 
names an essential quality of the object and also of human being. Its presence is 
itself productive since Geist names an immaterial presence that enlivens. Taken 
more generally however it allows for a distinction to be drawn between life as an 
engagement with the unconditioned and thus a sense of life open to 
transformation on the one hand, and, on the other, life as the enacted presence of 
normativity (the latter would obtain despite the content of normativity at any one 
historical moment).  
 
As a beginning, however, the nature of the separation between 
Nachmachung and Nachahmung is the issue. Indeed, Kant’s formulation does not 
involve a simple either/or. As consequence the force of the distinction between 
these two terms needs to be clarified. Reflexion 778 provides a different entry 
into what is at work within the distinction.   
 
The Germans have a talent for imitation (Die Deutschen sind von talent 
Nachahmer). This term has a worse reputation than it deserves. Imitation is 
very different from copying, and these are different from aping. 
(Nachahmen ist ganz was anderes als copiren, und dieses was anderes als 
nachäffen.) Imitation (Nachahmen) is not so different from genius as might 
have been thought. There is no progress of spirit (Fortschritt des Geistes), 
no invention, without really knowing how to imitate in new set of relations 
(in neuer Beziehung nachzuahmen).17  
 
Then, after quoting a number of examples, the Reflexion continues with the claim 
that while imitation is the true guide of the genius, it is the imitation ‘not of the 
letter or what is personal’ (nicht den Buchstaben und das Persohnliche,) rather 
what is imitated is ‘the spirit (den Geist) of the genius’.18 (Hence the 
predominating question is how, as a presentation or as an image, is the imitation 
of ‘spirit’ to be understood?) The imitating of the ‘letter’ is aping’ (Nachäffen). 
Milton imitated but did not copy. (Milton ahmete die großen Dichte, nach, aber 
nicht als copie das orignal). He does this in order ‘to surpass’ (zu übertreffen) his 
predecessors; the latter are the objects of his imitation. Works therefore, even 
works of genius, have what are described in the Reflexion as a ‘relation’ 
(Verhaltniss) to that which precedes it. The Reflexion ends with a return to the 
question of life. Aping lacks ‘liveliness’ (Lebhaften). While it lacks life what this 
means here is that it lacks ‘spirit’.  
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 While significant elements of the terminology that appears in §46-§49 of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment are also at work in the Reflexion, it is the 
presence of relationality within the Reflexion that underscores not just the 
presence of genius as a mode of production but that what is produced has a 
relation of indetermination to that which precedes it. There is a relation but not 
one that has a determining effect on form. Moreover, one of the key moments in 
the Reflexion is the distinction it envisages between the differing objects of 
imitation. Initially the distinction is between the ‘letter’ (Buchstaben) and the 
‘spirit’. The way into what is at stake within the distinction hinges on the capacity 
of the ‘letter’ to be copied and thus presented. While there is a clear historical 
dimension in any answer to the question of the nature of the distinction between 
‘letter’ and ‘spirit’, the argument here is that once taken philosophically the 
answer hinges on the presence of two different senses of produced object. The 
first is a conception of the object, in terms of a particular modality of 
presentation (thus of appearance). In this instance, the object, and thus what 
appears, is defined as the presentation of determined form. Presentation would 
become re-presentation. There would be therefore a formal determination. Even 
though the production of any object always has a relation to the history of 
aesthetic objects and thus the history of the image, the distinction between 
‘letter’ and ‘spirit’ and thus between copying and ‘imitation’ (Nachahmen) means 
that the production – the work of genius – will not then become the presentation of 
an already determined formal presence. The history of the object (now the object 
as art work) need not have a determining effect on the form of the presentation. 
What prevails therefore is a relation of indetermination. This opens up the second 
sense of produced object. In this instance, imitation differs from copying insofar as 
what appears within the former is not the re-presentation of an already 
determined presentation. What appears – in and as its appearance - surpasses that 
presentation. Surpassing occurs in the Reflexion in terms of the formulation 
Fortschritt des Geiste. What progresses, indeed the mark of its being progress, is 
that it does not have a predetermined form. Progress becomes an opening within 
the process of indetermination; production as the process of ‘indetermining’. 
Accordingly, progress is the production of what has been addressed by Kant in 
terms of ‘originality’ and thus as the production of the object as an original 
indetermination. Original indetermination is a mode of relationality.  It is however 
a relation of indetermination not determination. Indetermination as a process is 
contemporaneous with what Kant has already described in terms of ‘surpassing’. 
Consequently, as tracing the formulation of Kant’s conception of genius unfolds, 
there is a necessity to hold to the process of surpassing.  Surpassing occurs within 
the domain of formed objects and their concomitant judgment. Surpassing is a 
particular mode of relationality in which what is surpassed is the already 
determined presentation of a form. It is thus that part of the project here is not 
just to work out the nature of how the distinctions between copying and 
‘imitation’, and then ‘letter’ and ‘spirit’, are to be understood, but to engage with 
what is named within them. More strategically therefore, what has to be pursued 
is Geist. The presence of Geist names the point at which there is a constancy of 




To recap: Kant begins to respond to the question of spirit in the context of 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment when he identifies ‘copying’ 
(Nachmachung) with learning. Here spirit is missing. Copying is the reproduction of 
that which is learnt. Rather than a form of production, it is the mere reproduction 
of what is. Differences within the ambit of copying – the history of works that 
repeat the given – means that all that is maintained within them is variety within 
sameness and an immediacy of production. Neither surpassing nor unbinding 
obtains. Within the unfolding of the argument thus far as t occurs within §47 it is 
still not yet clear what the actual status of Nachahmung involves. Later in the 
same section there is a suggested clarification. Kant writes,  
Since, then, (the artist’s) natural gift must give the rule to (fine) art, what 
kind of rule is this? It cannot be couched in a formula and serve as a 
precept, for then a judgment about the beautiful could be determined 
according to concepts. Rather, the rule must be abstracted from what the 
artist has done, i.e., from the product, which others may use to test their 
own talent, letting it serve them as their model, not to be copied 
(Nachmachung) but to be imitated (Nachahmung),19 
This formulation opens up in a particular direction. It should be noted that when 
Kant connects the creation of the ‘rule’ as resulting ‘from the product’ what is 
being staged is the primacy of the object. Moreover, recalled here is the 
complexity already noted in Reflexion 778 since what it also instantiates is the 
possibility that the concept of imitation - thus its content - is no longer 
determined by a given content (and here the content could take the form of an 
image) that is reproducible. The distinction between, on the one hand, the copy 
and then, on the other, the result of mimetic production, is no longer to be 
thought in terms of the presence of a given content to be repeated and thus to be 
re-presented. The latter would be repetition as re-presentation in which what was 
repeated was already determined such that the re-presentation was already 
determined in advance. Nachahmung therefore is not straightforwardly imagistic if 
what it means to be an image is the presentation of that which is there – thus 
already given - to be presented. The product of genius continues to complicate the 
way that appearance is to be understood. In order to take up that complication, 
and thus to refine what is stake in the distinction between copy and imitation, it is 
essential to return to one of the elements of the formulation of the conception of 
genius that can be located slightly earlier in the text, i.e. in §46.  
 
What occurs in §46 is the uncovering of what can best be described as an 
instability within the produced object. It arises from both the nature and necessity 
of production. The presence of that instability repositions the object as 
inextricably bound up with the process of judgment. Moreover, it is an instability 
that has an effect on how the objectivity of the object – the object’s being as an 
object – is itself to be understood. This instability must be allowed to emerge. The 
first element that is important is a reiteration of genius in terms of production. 
Genius is described as a ‘talent for producing (hervorzubringen) that for which no 
determinate rule (keine bestimmte Regel) can be given’.20 It might have been 
conjectured that what should have been at work was a ‘determinate rule’ that 
organized and formed production. Indetermination involves the absence or 
suspension of such a conception of rule. The object is produced within this setting.  
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(While, of course, producing the setting itself.) What is produced – the object - 
must have ‘originality’ (Originalität) as its ‘primary characteristic’. And yet, if this 
were all that pertained with any one object, then the product of genius would not 
only have a single characteristic, i.e. originality, it would also be the case that 
such quality had a necessary immediacy. It would be this quality that appeared 
and thus were such a possibility to obtain then appearance would be immediate 
originality. Recognition would be immediate. Stability, originality and unity would 
delimit the nature of the object. Such a position is however impossible.  An 
impossibility that arises because of what attends the production of any object 
within this setting. It is a necessary element. It attends since production is neither 
intentional rule following, nor the presentation of a copy (as is now clear, for 
Kant, production is not copying). What attends is the possibility that any one 
original production could in fact be ‘original nonsense’ (originalen Unsinn).21  
Resulting from this possibility is therefore a founding instability that marks 
production from the start. More formally, this means that there is a type of 
doubling at the origin such that what matters at any one point in time is that the 
presentation – thus what appears - be rescued from the possibility of being 
‘nonsense’. This is a state of affairs, i.e. the possibility of nonsense, that can be 
overcome since while there is the giveness of what appears, what appears is 
always in excess of mere appearance. In Kant’s formulation, what appears and 
thus the object as produced acquires a form of complexity since the object must 
be more that itself. Such objects 
 
must at the same time (zugleich) be models, i.e. exemplary, hence while 
not themselves the result of imitation, they must yet serve others in that 
way, i.e. as a standard or a rule for judging (Regel der Beurteilung).22 
 
Kant, in his evocation of ‘original nonsense’, identifies the presence of a problem 
that is there once there is a distinction between copying and mediated original 
production. Namely, that such a form of production, were it to be understood as 
resulting in the simply given, does not immediately have the quality of sense. And 
here it is essential to note that what is at stake within the formulations that 
attend this position are particular modalities of giving. Genius is a ‘gift from 
nature’ (Naturgabe). Furthermore, it is genius that ‘gives’ (gibt) the ‘rule to art. 
Those productions are not ‘given’ (geben) a ‘determinate rule’. There is, as has 
been noted, a hovering indeterminate rule. While there is the continuity of modes 
of giving, what is given has two inseparable defining elements. It has an originally 
doubled quality that both necessitates and occasions judgment.  
 
Note the way this position is formulated. Nonsense would be a presentation 
of that which neither referred nor had meaning, where reference and sense are 
defined in terms of immediacy. Hence the question of what would Sinn mean in 
such a context? Hence the further question: What is the counter to the possibility 
that any presentation is no more than ‘original nonsense’? The answer to the 
second question hinges on that which is also given with(in) and as the object. 
While there is a production, that original gift cannot be reduced to pure 
appearance. This is, of course, the conception of appearance within empiricism in 
which the object is taken to be a pure self-referring singularity and thus 
immediately present. For Kant what appears, the produced object has another 
quality; a quality that precludes the reduction of what appears to pure 
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appearance. Kant is clear. That quality is there with the production. It is there ‘at 
the same time’ (zugleich). The object is both its appearance and, at the same 
time, there is another quality, which is also there, and which holds open the 
possibility that what appears not be nonsense. Kant’s formulation is clear: works 
or objects ‘must at the same time (zugleich) be models, i.e. exemplary’. The 
produced object is defined by an original sense of at-the-same-timeness that 
opens the object beyond the possibility of simple and original unity and thus pure 
immediate appearance. For it to be the production of genius what appears – that 
which is produced – as has been noted, must be, at the same time, ‘exemplary’ 
(exemplarisch). The term ‘exemplary’ has a specific meaning in this context. More 
generally, the exemplary can be understood as inextricably bound up with a 
presentation for which judgment has a contemporaneous and exigent presence. 
The presentation in being exemplary is, therefore, neither original nonsense nor a 
mechanical copy. 
 
The object as a production establishes a standard or a rule. Both the rule 
and the standard are provided by the object itself. While what is at work within 
this other quality stands in need of clarification, it should be clear that integral to 
the production’s exemplary status is the necessity that it come into relation. In 
other words, that it enjoins judgement. Judgment is a relation. Again, Kant’s 
formulation is precise. The object either acquires Sinn, or its status as having Sinn 
comes to be affirmed insofar as it is able to provide a ‘standard or a rule for 
judging’.23 Affirmation is judgment. The object of judgement however is not the 
production as a copy, thus what is there as the object of judgment is neither the 
content nor the presentation understood as mere presentation (or mere image). 
Within the latter the presentation – the appearance – would be a mode of re-
presentation. Thus, the giving of that which was taken as there to be given. 
(Allowing, of course, for the representations to be as much successful as 
unsuccessful). Repetition, in such a context, is a modality of sameness, rather than 
a relation of indetermination. That latter mode of relationality would obtain were 
the presentation to be original. The question of what is meant here by a ‘rule for 
judging’ can only be addressed adequately once it is situated within the context 
created by ‘aesthetic ideas’. (Moreover, the presence of this type of idea 
necessitates the reintroduction of Geist.) 
 
 The engagement with what Kant designates as ‘aesthetic ideas’ occurs in 
§49. The engagement arises in the context of the identification of certain works as 
having what has already been identified as ‘spirit’ (Geist). What is meant by 
‘spirit’ in this section of the text is defined in relation to a quality of the ‘soul’ 
(Seele); though it is a definition that maintains the already noted link between 
Geist and life. Spirit is the ‘lively principle in the mind’ (das belebende Prinzip in 
Gemüte). As a result of the nature of its presentation, as the presentation of life 
as activity – its end, life’s end – is maintaining ‘mental powers’ (Gemüteskrafte). 
This is the continuity of life – though it is life as worldliness and thus life as already 
having twisted free of its identification, let alone conflation, with the biological. 
Life is present here in terms of ‘spirit’ and thus as ‘mental powers’ which are to 
be maintained as such. Maintained, that is, without a determined end. Such a set 
of concerns, that is the movement of the mental power as having no end other 
than their own continuity, (this of, of course, a version of ‘purposiveness without a 
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purpose’) is associated with the presentation of ‘aesthetic ideas’. That 
presentation is defined in the following way:  
 
that representation of the imagination (Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft) 
that occasions much thinking without it being possible for any determine 
thought (ein bestimmiter Gedanke), i.e. concept to be adequate to it, 
which, consequently, no language fully (völlig) attains or can make 
intelligible.24 
 
Thought occurs. Thought has a relation to a concept without being determined by 
it. There is therefore a particular sense of relationality. What needs to be noted is 
the way in which what is at work here is a complex network of relations. The 
nature and quality of these relations are named in advance. They are relations 
that have an operative quality and thus their own economy. These qualities are 
signaled by the reiteration of forms of power. The relationship between 
Gemüteskrafte and Einbildungskraft involves a dynamic and thus a form of 
continuity that is self-defined. What continues is the work of the ‘mental powers’. 
They have a necessarily dynamic quality. Built into the term Einbildungskraft is a 
sense of activity. Einbildungskraft is the power of presentation. The imagination is 
productive. These powers effect. There is a combination of powers (Kräfte) and in 
being combined they can be described as the continuity of their own activity. 
Thinking continues without a telos other than that of thinking itself. Thinking has 
its end therefore in the continuity of its own activity. This position identifies 
thinking not as a cognitive ability but as an activity that is commensurate with life 
itself to the extent that the activity of thought is able to break open its conflation 
with utility and instrumentality. Hence one of Hannah Arendt’s most Kantian 
claims need not even name him. 
 
Thinking accompanies life and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of 
being alive; and since life is a process, its quintessence can only lie in the 
actual thinking process and not in any solid results or specific thoughts.25  
 
This is an instance of what might be described as the more generalizable power, 





 To continue opening up the aesthetic, and thus in continuing to move it 
beyond its delimited concerns, what has to be pursued next is the way there is a 
play of limits in §49. Judgment introduces the work of limits. As a beginning, it 
worth recalling the description of Milton that emerged in Reflexion 778. That 
Milton wrote; that Milton wrote in an identifiable poetic form; that Milton wrote in 
a language whose comprehensibility was already there, establishes the relation 
between those works, his actual poems, and the history of which they form a part, 
namely the history of poetic form. As already been noted for Kant Milton did not 
copy. On the contrary, he ‘imitated’. What can be discerned from his writings, for 
Kant, is that this occurs in order ‘to surpass’ (zu übertreffen) other writers. He 
imitated not consciously or intentionally, he imitated them simply because he 
wrote poetry as did they. This is imitation as a form of repetition without 
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determinant content. Milton imitated in a way that the imitation in question broke 
with any type of formal determination. The terminology of surpassing is integral to 
the description of genius; again, it is genius as a mode of production and not the 
description of a subject position (except as itself a produced after-effect). In the 
context of §49 it is essential for Kant to introduce the imagination in a way that 
accords with the structure of genius. As has been noted, it is the imagination 
which makes from nature what he describes as ‘another nature’. The imagination 
therefore is not bound by nature as the given. The imagination is a process of 
transformation.  This is its ‘power’. This transformation occurs with principles but 
without being determined by them. There is an important opening that occurs 
here. In Kant’s formulation ‘we feel our freedom from the law of association’ (wir 
unsere Freiheit vom Gesetze der Assoziation …fühlen.) There is therefore a step, 
one that is attended by ‘feeling’ that ‘surpasses nature (was die Nature 
übertrifft)’. Affect endures. Here there is the reiteration of what can be 
understood as the logic of surpassing. Milton, for Kant, writes ‘to surpass’; the 
imagination therefore works to ‘surpass nature’. The question to be addressed is 
how boundaries and limits are operative in the formulation of this section of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment and thus how concentration on the presence of 
limits furthers an understanding of genius as a mode of production.  
 
For Kant in the formulation of the argumentation of §49 ‘representations’ 
(Vorstellungen) of the imagination are called ‘ideas’. Remembering that the 
imagination works in this context ‘in its freedom from all guidance by rules (in 
Ihrer Freiheit von aller Anleitung der Regeln). There are two reasons Kant 
provides for the use of the term ‘idea’. In the first instance, there is a ‘striving’ 
towards the beyond; namely what he describes as the passage towards ‘something 
beyond the bounds of experience’ (etwas über die Erfahrungsgrenze). This first 
point is important as it indicates in a more precise way how the aesthetic can be 
delimited by processes of unbinding. There is the attempt to secure that which 
would take on the quality of an idea of reason precisely because it could be 
understood as a ‘concept of reason’. The second is that there can be no concept 
adequate to it.  Thus, it is the poet that continues to position, in Kant’s terms, the 
‘sensible beyond the limits of experience’ (über die Schranken der Erfahrung). 
This is a specific outcome. It amounts to moving presentation beyond ‘anything of 
which there is an example in nature’. The repetition of nature’s content no longer 
delimits or limits presentation. Here a new and important element of the overall 
argumentation is introduced. The imagination is described as that which ‘emulates 
(nacheifert) the precedent of reason in attaining to the maximum’. It is essential 
to pursue what is at stake in the activity of emulation since emulation names the 
mode of relationality appropriate to the concentration occurring here on 
production rather than on intentional agency.  
 
What is emulated is what might be described as a dynamic structure of 
thought. Emulation therefore is not defined by determined content. Content is not 
what is emulated. As a result, the question to be addressed concerns the nature of 
the relation between emulation and presentation. Central to any answer is the 
recognition that emulation as a mode of related production needs to be 
understood in terms of the presentation of an original indetermination. What is 
emulated is a productive structure of thought that while having a specific 
outcome, that outcome is always to be determined. Hence any outcome is what 
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has already been described here as an indetermination. Emulation therefore has 
neither a predetermined image, nor an already given formal determination. Again, 
emulation is a configuration of thought allowing for a presentation, rather than 
that which can be identified with the content of an already determined image. As 
a result, it opens the way towards an understanding of how genius breaks with a 
structure of imitation understood in terms of the interplay of repetition and 
sameness. Integral to the process is the undoing of limits and bounds in the first 
instance and then, in the second, the creation of openings. The movement towards 
this form of creation is presented in the next paragraph of §49. The reiteration of 
the language of the ‘unbounded’ is central to its occurrence.  
Now if we add to a concept a representation of the imagination that belongs 
to its presentation, but which by itself stimulates so much thinking that it 
can never be grasped in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically 
enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way (auf unbegrenzte Art), 
then in this case the imagination is creative, and sets the faculty of 
intellectual ideas (reason) into motion, that is, at the instigation of a 
representation it gives more to think about than can be grasped and made 
distinct in it (although it does, to be sure, belong to the concept of the 
object).26  
Part of what it at stake in the identification of the ‘unbounded’ is that the 
imagination is not limited by its relation to the determined to the extent that it is 
constrained to repeat it. Indeed, the opposite is the case. In Rudolf Makkreel’s 
formulation even though ‘it remains tied to the sensible realm itself’, it is 
nonetheless not a re-presentation of an already determined form of the sensible.27 
It is not bounded to it. Thus, it is the state of being unbounded that de-limits the 
activity of the imagination. There is, therefore, an opening. The limit is only ever 
there as an after effect, even if its condition of possibility attends every creative 
act. It emerges when, in Kant’s terms, ‘judgment … adapts the imagination to the 
understanding’.28 This adaptation is the introduction of a limit. It is, of course, a 
limit that at every moment genius and the imagination, through further acts of 
production, can work to undo.  
 
 However, it is important to pursue the development of this position in the 
context of §49. Now, in order to clarify the way in which presentation and the 
breakdown of the determining hold of limits and boundaries occur, Kant takes up 
what he describes as the ‘aesthetic attributes’ of an object. What is important 
here is that these are the attributes of an object whose concept ‘as an idea of 
reason cannot be adequately presented’. The example used to identify what is 
take in this set up is ‘Jupiter’s eagle’. The eagle is an attribute, though it does not 
have the already determined status of a logical attribute. Logical attributes, for 
Kant, represent what is there with concepts. They both limit and delimit. There is 
a limit imposed within the subject/object relation. As a result, there is an 
essential closure. The ‘aesthetic’ attribute has a different field of activity. The 
subject/object relation within it is fundamentally different.  The imagination is 
caused to ‘spread itself over a multitude of related representations (verwandten 
Vorstellungen)’. The limit of connection and then the concept’s capacity to 
express is reached. The limits imposed by relations of predication are undone and, 
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with the emergence of the ‘aesthetic idea’, there are effects. The mind is 
affected. This effected/affected state is described by Kant as that which works, 
  
to enliven the mind by opening up for it the prospect of an immeasurable 
field of related representations (un das Gemüt zu beleben, indem sie ihm 
die Aussicht in ein unabsehliches Feld verwandter Vorstellungen 
erüoffnet).29  
 
The life of the mind therefore occurs within ‘an unmeasurable field’ (ein 
unabsehliches Feld). Works of ‘beautiful art’ are ‘enlivened’ (belebt) by the 
presence in them of ‘spirit’. Such works ‘give’ (geben) the imagination the prompt 
to think. Again, what is occurring here is the reiteration of a modality of giving. 
Giving is not however a causal relation. All the gift can do is create the conditions 
for thought. Hence what endues, and thus that which predominates, are relations 
of indetermination.  
 
 In order to reinforce the argumentation that he is developing Kant adduces 
a further example. This time it takes the form of his own German prose translation 
of a poem by Friedreich II (der Große König). The poem was originally written in 
French. While not argued for directly in the text the claim here is that the 
elements of the poem that interest Kant concern life. The cited extract from the 
poem begins by announcing a departure ‘from life’ (dem Leben). (That life has a 
form of centrality in this context is reinforced by the fact that in the French 
original the poem’s protagonist is departing from ‘l’Univers. It is Kant therefore 
who names ‘life’ directly.) The departure is articulated in terms set by the image 
of the sun. Even as it sets the sun’s radiance continues to spread. It shines forth. 
Its ‘final moments’ are for the ‘well-being of the world’ (das Wohl der Welt). Of 
the poem Kant writes that its ‘enlivens’ (belebt) as a result of the work of the 
imagination which stages a set of relations with both sensation and ‘indirectly 
related representations’ (Nebenvorstellungen) ‘for which no expression can be 
found’. (By the latter Kant means no determined singular expression.) The poem 
works therefore beyond the limit. It allows for what Kant identifies as ‘the 
consciousness of virtue (das Bewußtsein der Tugend)’ such that a subject then 
comes to occupy, on the level of thought, the position of the virtuous person. This 
provides a set of feelings which are ‘sublime’ and ‘calm’ and then more 
emphatically as those which can engender what he describes as ‘a boundless 
prospect into a happy future’ (eine grenzenlose Aussicht in eine frohe Zukunft). 
The emergence of the ‘boundless’, precisely because what is at work are aesthetic 
connections and not logical ones, is itself marked by a form of necessary 
contingency. Original indetermination is, of course, equally thus characterized. 
(Here is another instance of a structural affinity between the Kantian ‘aesthetic’ 
and the moral.) To return to Kant’s concern with life. The poem ‘enlivens’ 
(belebt) what is described as ‘the idea of reason of a cosmopolitan disposition’ – 
namely Friedreich II’s. Here there is an enlivening that occurs ‘even at the end of 
life’ (noch am Ende des Lebens).  There are therefore two senses of life. What 
then of their relation? Answering this question will take on the guise of a 
conclusion. 
 
 In §50 ‘fine art’ is given a description that reintroduces, albeit through a 
form of association, the question of life. Kant writes that:   
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Now insofar as art shows genius it does indeed deserve to be called inspired 
(geistreich), but it deserves to be called fine art only insofar as it shows 
taste.30 
 
The second part of this formulation is the opening to the centrality of criticism 
within Romanticism insofar as its claim is that ‘fine art’ is ‘fine art’ to the extent 
that it becomes an object of judgment, which is to say that it is criticisable.31 
However, here what matters is the first part. A work of genius is described as 
geistreich; thus, as inspired (i.e. full of Geist). Geist returns. An inspired work is 
already the locus of inspiration. Thus, it is already that which allows for a 
separation – albeit a separation in medias rei – of formal presence, that which is 
the simple presentation of determined content, from that which informs. The 
latter – the process of informing - is an immaterial force. Any one object is, of 
course, their interrelated co-presence; holding ‘at the same time’. The presence 
of both therefore allows for a redescription of the object such that matter 
becomes the locus of that immaterial force. The denial of the presence of this 
force, which here would be the denial of the possibility of the ‘inspired’ work, 
would have as one of its most direct consequence the reduction of the material to 
the empirical. While in a more restricted historical context what is at work here is 
a modality of the distinction between the spirit and the letter, and it is exactly 
that distinction that also generates a specific hermeneutical project, of particular 
significance within the context of a philosophical engagement with Kant on 
‘genius’, is the way that Geist, and thus inspired work, can be understood as 
charging the given, the everyday, what could have been mere presentation, with 
that possibility that opens life to the possibility of ‘a boundless prospect’.  
 
The opening up of life, an opening which surpasses any measure and thus 
any limit – note that here limits and boundaries need to be understood as the mark 
of an ineliminable finitude – turns the setting in question towards the 
‘immeasurable’ (and thus by extension towards the infinite and the 
unconditioned). That turning - its contingent necessity – is also there within the 
realm of the ethical.  Providing both the possibility for judgement, and in striving 
to attain an infinite that insists and locates the dutiful act within the striving 
itself.32 Indeed, Kant’s refusal in the Critique of Practical Reason to identify the 
insistence of the unconditioned with the conception of the ‘highest good’ or the 
‘good life’ as they appear in the history of philosophy, indicates that the locus of 
the ethical, as with the force of the aesthetic, involves a relation between the 
conditioned and the unconditioned understood as a distinction on the level of 
quality not quantity. The ‘mind’ for Kant is enlivened by and within this sense of 
turning. Enlivening here can be understood as a prospect for life that inheres in 
the given but emerges in the move towards the immeasurable. It is this movement 
that both enlivens and in which the subjectivity discovers its finitude. (A discovery 
that is (in) the gift of the infinite.) That movement is the affirmation of Geist; that 
movement is what is always there in the work of genius. This is why such works 
allow for and encourage emulation. The life that is delimited by death, the sense 
of life that is structured by the opposition life/death, is the conception of life that 
is both undone and surpassed by the life of the protagonist of Friedreich II’s poem. 
That life has effects that resist measure, in the strict sense of having been 
positioned within a turning towards the ‘immeasurable’. Hence, enlivening is the 
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quality that constitutes life ‘beyond nature’, even though that life is marked by an 
almost inevitable precarity. 
  
To return finally to the opening questions. Both of them addressed forms of 
possible generalizability. In the first instance, it was the object and in the second 
it was the subject. Taken as a whole, the question of generalizability can in part 
be accounted for in terms of the Romantic response to Kant in which the 
imagination became the defining faculty. For Novalis logic was concerned ‘simply 
with the dead body of the philosophy of mind’, ‘metaphysics’ on the other hand is 
described as ‘the pure dynamics of thinking’ and thus the ‘soul of the philosophy 
of mind’. Novalis aspired to the possible integration of those elements.33 That 
integration would have occurred in what more generally would have to be 
understood as the now extended presence of the Kantian conception of the 
imagination. This is extension finds expression in Novalis’ Fichte Studies thus: 
‘Genius belongs to Philosophizing’.34 What is clear in addition is that the question 
of the subject has extension precisely because once the practical is emphasised 
what is then essential is that the subject’s own self-understanding can then be said 
to occur to the extent that finitude is delimited by what can be described in 
Kantian terms as the recognition of a supersensible vocation. It is of course a 
vocation that orientates. This links the moral and the aesthetic insofar as that 
recognition which taken place in both domains – thus causing the question of their 
precise difference to obtain a genuine sense of acuity - is, as has been noted, that 
conception of finitude in which finite being is itself delimited by the infinite. It is 
this infinite that continues to be named differently. It is as much the 
‘unconditioned’ as it is the ‘immeasurable’; it also there at the moment at which 
Geist works to undo limits and borders since Geist does not just enliven, it 
enlivens by introducing into finite life, redefining it thereby, that which turns it 
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